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P1·ocedm·al Due Process 
relations of a citizen can be changed by insurrection, the 
war power must be invoked, which would require a 
declaration of war by Congress, acquiesced in by action of 
the president. In his view, no civil war existed until 
Congress declared war on July 13, 1861 , after which it 
was recognized that in southern ports customs duties 
could not be collected because the ports were held by 
those in rebellion. 
Although ostensibly a five-to-four decision, the four 
dissenters did not enter reasons for their objections to the 
holding on the Mexican-owned ship, and it is unlikely 
that they objected to the fundamental finding that 
Lincoln possessed the authority to take all necessaty steps 
to put down the insurrection. Without a doubt, this 
decision judicially sustained the actions taken by Lincoln, 
and upheld the authority of the U.S. president. 
Before the Prize Cases were argued, many American 
were concerned about how the Supreme Court would rule. 
The decision in DredScottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), 
rendered a few years earlier, had not been popular because 
it had questioned certain powers of the federal government, 
and the implications of rhe Dred Scott decision were being 
widely discussed at the time. In addition, the argument 
could be made that, on basis of the Prize Cases decision, 
American citizens owed a greater loyalty to the federal 
government than to their state government, although this 
issue was not directly addressed in the opinion. 
SEE ALSO Chase Court; Civil War; Lincoln, Abraham; 
Taney Court 
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
Due process is the Constitution's promise of fair play. A 
due process clause in the Fifth Amendment binds the 
federal government; an identical clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment binds state and local governments. The text 
explicitly makes these promises to any person. Govern-
ments must therefore afford due process not only to all 
actual persons without regard to their citizenship or 
domicile, bur also to all legal persons, including 
corporations and partnerships. 
The history of liberty has largely been the 
history of observance of procedural 
safeguards. 
SOURCE: Felix Frankfurter, McNabb v. United States, 
318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). 
The promise of due process has two dimensions, 
substantive and procedural. For more than a century, the 
Supreme Court has embraced a theory of substantive due 
process that restrains governments from interfering with 
certain fundamental human choices and activities except in 
circumstances sufficiently compelling to reviewing courts. 
The theory of procedural due process allows governments 
generally to interfere in our affairs, but only in compliance 
with an etiquette that requires prior notice, an adequate 
hearing, an unbiased decider, and some justification. The 
promise of a hearing serves only those disputing a 
government's version of rel~vant facts, not its interpretation 
of applicable law. Whether the sort of hearing offered by 
government, in lieu of a formal trial, suffices in any 
particular context is a matter for courts to decide by 
balancing the importance to the individual of the liberty or 
property in jeopardy against government's interest in 
economical administration and the associated risk of 
mistake (Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19 [1976]). 
According to the Supreme Court, procedural due 
process matters only when government acts deliberately, 
not when it acts negligently or carelessly (Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 [1986]). Moreover, the promise 
of fair play applies only when government interferes with 
life, liberty, or property. The process of criminal 
prosecution is regulated largely by other, more specific 
procedural guarantees in Article III of the Constitution 
and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. 
Due process dictates the procedure for involuntary 
commitment of the mentally ill, entitling them to contest 
in advance their confinement (Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418 [1979]). According to the Supreme Court, 
liberty protected by due process includes not just freedom 
from physical restraint but also il}dividual fieedoms 
specified elsewhere in the Constitution, such as freedom 
of speech and free exercise of religion. Moreover, the 
Court has assumed for itself the final say as to what other 
human choices and activities qualify as liberties for which 
due process is assured. Meanwhile, the Court has treated 
as property protected by due process not just real estate 
and personal belongings, bur also professional licenses, 
public contracts, tenure in office, and various forms of 
public subsidy. The key is whether ordinary law, state or 
federal, has established a particular inreresr sufficiently to 
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make a person's claim to it something more chan wishful 
thinking (Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U. 
s. 564 [1972]). 
SEE ALSO Fourteenth Amendment; Goldberg v. KeLLy, 397 
U.S. 254 (1970); Substantive Due Process 
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PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CASES 
The Supreme Court regularly grapples with emotionally 
charged issues important to everyday Americans, such as 
religion and politics. In 1922 the Court did the same 
thing regarding America's pastime, professional baseball. 
In Federal BasebaLL Club of Baltimore v. National League of 
Professional BasebaLL Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), the 
Court held that professional baseball was exempt from the 
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which prohibits 
"restraints of trade" and monopolies that affect interstate 
commerce. That same legislation had been used during 
the three prior decades to "bust up" monopolies in other 
areas of American business, such as the railroads and oil 
companies. However, the Court decided that the antitrust 
laws simply did not apply to professional baseball. While 
the basis of the Court's decision might appear to have 
concerned a technical legal issue, the decision had a 
dramatic impact on the evolution of professional 
baseball- an impact char has continued, in part, into 
the twenty-first century. 
The impetus of the Federal Baseball Club litigation 
was the collusion between the two main professional 
baseball leagues, the National League and American 
League, to destroy a newer, third league, the Federal 
League. The two established leagues worked together to 
buy out the various clubs of the Federal League, with the 
intent of shutting it down. The Baltimore dub, whose 
business was destroyed by the buyout of all the ocher 
Federal League teams, filed an antitrust lawsuit against the 
American and National Leagues under the Sherman Act. 
The Baltimore club prevailed in the trial court and 
obtained what was then substantial money damages. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the 
trial court. 
P1·ojessional Baseball Cases 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion 
written by Justice Oliver Wendell H olmes Jr. (1841-
1935), declared that the Sherman Act did not apply to 
the alleged monopolistic actions of the National and 
American leagues because professional baseball games are 
"nor a subject of commerce" among the states. In order 
for the act to apply, monopolistic actions must interfere 
with interstate commerce. Because the Coun held chat 
professional baseball did not implicate interstate com-
merce, the National and American leagues' buyout, 
which unquestionably was monopolistic, was not deemed 
illegal. 
Justice Holmes's opinion was clearly wrong as a 
matter of fact and law. Judge H enry Friendly (1903-
1986)- in his decision for the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Salerno v. American League, 429 
F.2d 1003 (1970)-wrore char the opinion "was not one 
of Mr. Justice H olmes' happiest days." From irs earliest 
days in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
professional baseball was indeed a business that involved 
interstate commerce. The very nature of professional 
baseball has always involved teams from various cities 
regularly playing teams from other cities, including those 
located in different states. The first professional baseball 
team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, traveled more chan 
11,000 miles in 1869, playing teams from many different 
states in the process. The first World Series, in 1903, was 
between an American League team from Boston and a 
National League team from Pittsburgh. The players were 
paid handsome sums even in the earliest days of 
professional baseball, spectators were charged for admis-
sion, and team owners often profited greatly from the 
business of baseball. 
Nevertheless, Justice Holmes's unanimous opinion 
was the law of the land, and it remained so for decades to 
come. In 1953 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier 
decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356. In 
Toolson several major league baseball players Hied an 
antitrust lawsuit challenging the "reserve clause" that each 
of the major league baseball teams had employed since the 
1880s. The reserve clause was a device whereby each 
major league team owned the contractual rights of its 
players for their entire professional lives. The teams rhus 
had the absolute right to keep players, or to trade them to 
other teams without their consent. T he effect of the clause 
was to dramatically limit the bargaining power of 
individual players. If a player demanded a higher salary 
or wanted to be traded and his team refused, the player's 
only option was to stop playing. Under the reserve clause 
arrangement, the ocher teams agreed not to hire any player 
who had boycotted his team. As a result, players' salaries, 
while much higher than chose of average Americans, were 
nothing like the multimillion-dollar salaries chat many 
players command in the early twenty-ftrst century. 
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